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Decentralized Self-enforcing Trust Management
System for Social Internet of Things
Muhammad Ajmal Azad, Samiran Bag, Feng Hao Senior Member, IEEE and Andrii Shalaginov,
Member, IEEE
Abstract—The Internet of Things, or IoT, is the network of connected computing devices that have the ability to transfer valued data
between each other via the Internet without requiring human intervention. In such a connected environment, the Social Internet of
Things (SIoT) has become an emerging trend where multiple IoT devices owned by users support communication within a social circle.
Trust management in the SIoT network is imperative as trusting the information from compromised devices could lead to serious
compromises within the network. It is important to have a mechanism where the devices and their users evaluate the trustworthiness of
other devices and users before trusting the information sent by them. The privacy-preservation, decentralization and self-enforcing
management without involving trusted third parties are the fundamental challenges in designing a trust management system for SIoT.
To fulfill these challenges, this paper presents a novel framework for computing and updating the trustworthiness of participants in the
SIoT network in a self-enforcing manner without relying on any trusted third party. The privacy of the participants in the SIoT is
protected by using homomorphic encryption in the decentralized setting. To achieve the properties of self-enforcement, the trust score
of each device is automatically updated based on its previous trust score and the up-to-date tally of the votes by its peers in the
network with zero-knowledge proofs to enforce that every participant follows the protocol honestly. We evaluate the performance of the
proposed scheme and present evaluation benchmarks by prototyping the main functionality of the system. The performance results
show that the system has a linear increase in computation and communication overheads with more participants in the network.
Furthermore, we prove the correctness, privacy, and security of the proposed system under a malicious adversarial model.




The Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of connected
smart devices, sensors, actuators, and people that use the
Internet for transferring valued information. These smart
devices produce a massive amount of data that can be
used for meaningful analytics. The number of smart and
connected IoT devices has dramatically increased over the
last few years. It has been predicted that there would be
around more than 29 billion connected devices by the year
2022, of which around 65% (18 billion) will be related to
smart IoT 1 devices. The boom in the IoT business has
also increased business and financial opportunities. It has
been predicted that by 2025, the IoT business could have
an annual economic forecast of $3.9 trillion to $11.1 trillion
worldwide. The success of IoT will critically depend on the
security and trust of these devices.
A standard IoT system is similar to the traditional peer-
to-peer (P2P) network where there exist two types of parties,
one using services, and the other providing services. It is
important for the service requester to evaluate the trustwor-
thiness of the IoT devices and their users before acting on
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1. Internet of Things forecast https://www.ericsson.com/en/mobility-
report/internet-of-things-forecast
the information provided by them. The trust evaluation of
the IoT devices and users is important because there exist
malicious entities in the network who want to misuse the
network resources for malicious purposes such as spreading
malware or false information. Furthermore, it is important
to identify misbehaving IoT objects before they bring dam-
age to the overall IoT-based smart system. The aggregated
trust of devices and their owners in the IoT system could
help service requester to make meaningful decisions before
acting on the provided information. Trust management sys-
tems can provide a way to evaluate the trustworthiness of
devices and identify malicious actors. Trust evaluation sys-
tems have been widely used in many domains for various
purposes: e.g., they have been deployed in the vehicular
and ad-hoc wireless network to evaluate the trustworthiness
of vehicles and objects [1], [2], utilized in the P2P (peer to
peer) networks [3], [4] to assess the behavior of peers before
downloading the content, used in online marketplaces to
provide opinions to users how retailers are behaving in
their past transactions [5]–[7], and used in value-added
communication networks (such as email, telephony, social
networks) [8] for the identification of untrusted parties by
leveraging collaboration among users of the network.
The trust management approaches for the social Internet
of Things mainly involve users of the system to provide
their views about the behavior of others. In these settings,
the data or feedback reported by each user may have some
private, sensitive information, hence require full protection
from disclosure. Therefore, it is important to consider user
privacy while designing a trust management system to
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protect the private information of individual users. Existing
trust management systems preserve privacy of users by
utilizing three major methods: a) anonymization [9]–[11]
which replaces the true identity of the participant with a
randomized identity before reporting the data for analysis;
b) data perturbation [12], [13], which perturbs data with
added noise to minimize the information leakage to intrud-
ers; and c) cryptography [14]–[20] that computes analytics of
the shared data using secure multiparty computation tech-
niques. Although the anonymization systems can ensure
the privacy of users, however, these approaches can still be
bypassed through de-anonymization methods. The privacy
can also be protected through the use of a trusted third-party
system [21]–[23], however, in such settings the users have to
trust the central system for protecting private information.
Furthermore, many of the existing systems ensure privacy
and security for the users data only for participants who
provide honest feedback but try to infer private information
of others (i.e., honest-but-curious) [3], [17], [24], [25]. These
systems could be easily misused in practice by malicious
actors providing fake out-of-range trust scores.
The trust management system for the decentralized so-
cial IoT should ensure the following: 1) the system design
should ensure that neither the sensitive information of
participants nor their private communication network is
exposed to other users of the system; 2) it should not use
trusted third party systems for holding user feedback; 3)
it should be suitable for resource-constrained devices to
maintain small communication bandwidth and computa-
tion overheads, and 4) the computation of the final scores
should be verifiable by users of the system, 5) the system
should be self-enforcing in the sense that it updates the
trust score by itself in a verifiable manner without involving
any trust third party, and finally, 6) the system should also
consider interaction between the IoT devices and social
network of people who own those devices.
To address these challenges, in this paper, we describe
a new trust evaluation system for the Social Internet of
Things (SIoT), which enables participants of the IoT ecosys-
tem to evaluate the social and observable behavior of IoT
objects before having any interaction with those objects.
The computation of the trust score of IoT devices and users
is based on the crowd-sourced information contributed by
users of the system in a collaborative way. The system has
inherent properties of self-enforcing updates of the trust
scores and public verification of the scores contributed by
the participants of the system. The aggregated trust score
of the IoT object and user is computed in a secure, private
and decentralized manner without revealing any individual
feedback value used in the computation process.
Our trust management system is self-enforcing, which
means that the participants of the system execute the steps
of the protocol to compute the trust scores of everyone else
in the system in a publicly verifiable manner without in-
volving any trusted third party. The use of zero-knowledge
proofs effectively enforces every participant to honestly
follow the protocol specification. If anyone misbehaves in
the system, the misbehavior will be publicly evident and
their trust scores will degrade gradually until an extreme
point such that misbehaving parties will be automatically
expelled from the network.
In the proposed system, the participants first rank their
interacted users and IoT devices based on their past be-
havior and then report the encrypted feedback values to
a public bulletin board, which is readable to all but writable
only to authenticated entities. The encrypted trust scores
of the objects are then aggregated in a secure multi-party
computation setting without letting participants infer the
private feedback values of other individuals. This design
does not place any trusted system or trusted set up for
protecting the private information of individuals. In this pa-
per, we consider the malicious adversarial model, in which
malicious entities are not willing to follow the protocol
specification and try to provide fake out-of-range feedback
scores in order to affect operations of the system. The design
also allows verification of trust scores reported by all partic-
ipants. We prototype the main functionality of the protocol
and assess its performance and provide security analysis.
The results show that the system has a small overhead in
both the computation load and communication bandwidth.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• A new privacy-preserving decentralized system is
presented for assessing the trustworthiness of IoT
nodes and their users in a Social IoT ecosystem. The
system considers the important properties of using
the social network and the users interaction behavior
with the IoT objects. The proposed system utilizes
the semantics of homomorphic cryptographic tech-
niques with efficient zero-knowledge proof methods
for protecting the privacy of the user data.
• The proposed system has an important novel fea-
ture: namely, the self-enforcing update of the trust
score with public verifiability without involving any
trusted third party.
• The system ensures privacy and security of the par-
ticipant’s private information under the malicious
and honest-but-curious adversary models by using
efficient zero-knowledge proof.
• A performance benchmarks are provided by imple-
menting the prototype for the main functions of the
system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we review the state of the art in SIoT and other
domains specifically focusing on privacy-preservation. In
Section 3, we present a discussion on the preliminaries used
in the design of the proposed system. Section 4 defines
the problem. Section 5 presents the system architecture
and discusses important features of the system. Section 6
describes protocol operations and the aggregation process.
Section 7 provides a discussion on the privacy and security
of the proposed system. Section 8 analyses the complexity of
the system. Section 9 empirically evaluates the computation
and communication performance of the system. Section 10
concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
This section reviews existing works on trust management
in social IoT, intelligent transportation systems and P2P
networks.
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2.1 Trust Management in Social IoT
Over recent years, trust management in the social IoT
ecosystem has received great attention. [26]–[28]. In an IoT
environment the trust of devices changes with respect to
environment, circumstances, and scenarios. Chen et al. [29]
identified a number of environment and social features
and suggested a model for adaptive trust estimation in
the social IoT system. However, the system has not given
importance to the privacy of users and furthermore, the
trust scores of users could reveal the communication and
movement patterns of users in the network. Nitti et al. [30]
proposed schemes for identifying unreliable nodes by ac-
cumulating the trust feedback contributed by other users.
In these schemes, the direct experience of the IoT nodes
could be exposed to other nodes, hence not providing
privacy-preservation. Further, it also reveals the commu-
nication network of IoT nodes. Chen et al. [31] proposed
IoT-Trust, a system for computing the trust of IoT devices
by using the semantics of the Software-Defined Network
(SDN) and cross-layer communication protocol. However,
the solution does not protect the privacy of the IoT devices
and their users. Hui et al. [32], [33] proposed a context-aware
framework for the computation of the trustworthiness of
IoT nodes in the SIoT. The system considers the concepts
from social and physiological science for computing the
trust between IoT objects and their owners. Anuoluwapo
et al. [34] proposed a collaborative approach that reliably
estimates the trust between objects in the IoT network.
However, the privacy aspects are not considered in this
work. In [35] the privacy of the user is protected by using
homomorphic encryption techniques that enable a user to
provide trust scores in the encrypted form and only the
aggregate result is decrypted. Chen et al. [36] computed
trust and reputation of IoT objects using collaborative filter-
ing methods. The approach uses similarity measure, social
contract and community of interest while computing the
aggregated trust. The privacy of nodes is not considered
in the design.
Several trust evaluation systems have been proposed to
ensure that the privacy of IoT nodes remains preserved
during the computation process. A privacy-preserving rep-
utation system is proposed by Yan et al. [17] which uses
an additive homomorphic encryption system and an ad-
ditive Pallier-cryptosystem for the preservation of trust
values of IoT nodes. However, the privacy properties are
only achieved in an honest-but-curious model, in which
nodes correctly follow the protocol steps and always pro-
vide honest feedback within the prescribed range but
meanwhile trying to learn private information of others.
The homomorphic-encryption based scheme achieves op-
timized computation, whereas the Paillier-based cryptosys-
tem achieves high security but is not computationally ef-
ficient. Prem et al. [37] proposed a private data sharing
scheme in the IoT network to protect privacy. The scheme
uses cloud storage to ensure privacy of private data of
users and performs data analytics in a secure way using
a homomorphic encryption scheme. For this purpose, the
data points from the IoT devices are randomly distributed
among the cloud data holders and are then aggregated in
a secure way. The scheme provides privacy-preservation
and correct computation only for the semi-honest nodes.
Jeonggil et al. [38] proposed the MEDiSN framework that
accumulates the data from the sensors in the wireless sensor
network. The framework specifically uses a centralized data
store for the collection and aggregation. The end-users need
to trust the centralized data store for privacy-preservation
and security.
Recently blockchain technology has also been used to
assure the privacy of users in an IoT network [39]. Chen
et al. [40] designed a blockchain-based model to protect
the privacy of participants in the big data environment.
The system is more generally designed for protecting raw
data but in our case, we protect the users data while still
performing some meaningful analytics over the encrypted
data without actually decrypting it. Gan et al. [41] proposed
a privacy-preservation model for task allocation in a crowd-
sourced environment. The privacy of IoT nodes which allo-
cate jobs to others is protected by the means of task division
and hiding social network of IoT nodes. Fortino et al. [42]
designed a blockchain-based model to distribute the repu-
tation score among nodes in a distributed IoT network. The
proposed approach first computes the reputation of each
node in the network and then develops the collaborative
network among nodes for the network-wide view about the
trustworthiness of nodes in the network as a whole. Tang
et al. [43] proposed a protocol named IoT Passport that
enables IoT devices from a different platform to collaborate
with each other using the blockchain system. In this setup,
the interaction between devices is signed with a digital
signature and recorded in the temper-proof blockchain. A
three-player game model is proposed in [44] that protects
private information and friendship network of devices and
users in the context of the connected social Internet of
Things.
2.2 Trust Management in Transportation Systems
Several trust models have been proposed for evaluating
the trustworthiness of vehicles in the Internet of vehicles
network [45], [46]. Tong et al. [47] proposed a three-layered
distributed model to identify malicious vehicles in the ve-
hicular network. Azad et al. [48] proposed TrustVote that
aggregates the trust scores of vehicles in a decentralized way
while preserving the privacy of users. The system utilizes
a homomorphic system for the privacy-preservation, how-
ever, the system does not provide self-enforcement and self-
correctness in the process of updating the scores. Guleng
et al. [49] compute the trustworthiness of nodes on the
Internet of Vehicle network by applying the fuzzy logic
theory to the trust scores of vehicles. Yang et al. [50] used
blockchain technology to compute the trustworthiness of
vehicles by first validating the information provided by the
participants. Riahi Sfar et al. [51] presented a context-aware
system for the intelligent transportation system that not only
assures privacy of users but also considers the environment
attributes while evaluating the behavior of the nodes.
2.3 Trust Management in P2P Networks
Several homomorphic systems have been proposed within
the context of crowdsourcing and P2P networks. Dongx-
iao et al. [23] proposed a reputation system that hides
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the identity of consumers using anonymous identities to
ensure the confidentiality and integrity of reviews sub-
mitted by the consumers. The system is specifically based
on the blockchain technology with efficient proof-of-stake.
Chenglin et al. [52] proposed a PPTD (privacy-preserving
truth discovery) framework which computes functions over
the sensor data reported by users using a homomorphic
cryptosystem. Kajino et al. [53] proposed a homomorphic
encryption-based scheme to preserve privacy of users in
the crowdsourced application. In [54] the aggregated trust
of the nodes is computed in the decentralized setting by
using an additive cryptographic system. The system ensures
privacy of participants but it requires participants to adhere
to the protocol operations. In [3], [55] the trust scores are
aggregated in the decentralized way which ensures privacy
and correctness in the presence of disruptive malicious in-
truders and semi-honest adversaries. However, the protocol
requires a set of trusted users whom the participants need
to trust for holding and processing of private information.
In [22], the authors proposed a decentralized system for
the privacy-preserving exchange of information related to
the identities of the users. The system specifically ensures
privacy and correctness through the use of a blockchain
system and zero-knowledge proof techniques. In [56] the
authors proposed a publicly verifiable aggregation scheme
that ensures privacy of users by deploying a trusted third
party system. However, the system only considers semi-
honest users.
2.4 Final Remarks
To the best of our knowledge, the work presented in this
paper is the first attempt to assess the trustworthiness of
users and their IoT nodes within Social IoT ecosystems
while ensuring the following major properties: privacy-
preservation, self-enforcing computation of trust scores and
public verification of aggregate trust scores. The proposed
system achieves privacy-preservation under both malicious
and semi-honest threat models. By contrast, existing sys-
tems preserve privacy under a semi-honest model and do
not provide public verification and self-enforcement. The
proposed scheme has a small computation and communica-
tion bandwidth overhead which makes the scheme suitable
for the resource-constrained IoT network. The proposed
system executes all its steps in a decentralized manner and
fully ensures confidentiality of information contributed by
the participants.
3 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide background on the social internet
of things (SIoT) and the cryptographic tools used in the
design of the privacy-preserving trust management system.
3.1 Social Internet of Things
In this paper, we evaluate the trustworthiness of IoT devices
for the setup shown in Figure 1. We define two types
of parties in our SIoT setup: users and devices that are
owned by the users. We define IoT nodes in the network as
D = D1, D2, . . . , Dn, and the users who own these devices
Fig. 1: The Social Internet of Things System.
as U = U1, U2, . . . , Un. Suppose IoT devices and users com-
municate with each other using communication technolo-
gies like ZigBee, Bluetooth or GSM. A single user may have
many IoT devices that perform particular tasks, e.g., moni-
toring road conditions, temperature, etc. These devices can
be any handheld device: for example smartwatch, mobile
phone, laptop, connected smart vehicle, etc. The communi-
cation between IoT users and devices can be represented as
a graph like structure where nodes are the end-users or de-
vices and edges are the communication links between them.
The graph network of IoT devices and users is represented
as G = {U,E}, where E ∈ {U × U} is a set of edges,
each denoting the relationship between users/devices in
the SIoT. Figure 1 provides a simple example of a generic
connected network where D = D1, D2, . . . , Dn, is the set of
nodes capable of providing services to other IoT devices,
and U = U1, U2, . . . , Un represents a set of users who
own these devices. Furthermore, devices provide services to
other devices as well, for example, D1 of user U1 provides
service to D2 of user U2. We assume each device in the
network provides a particular service to other devices and
users. For example, a smart vehicle can assist other road
users by providing value-added information. The user in
this setting would also provide feedback about their interac-
tion so that other nodes become aware of the past behavior
of certain nodes. This can help other users of the system to
know the trustworthiness of devices or users before making
any decision about the information provided from them.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the trustworthiness of
users and devices simultaneously in a privacy-preserving
and decentralized way.
Each IoT device and each user in the network has a
unique identity that is being used for evaluating the trust-
worthiness of the users and IoT devices in the network.
Inspired from the social relationships between people, there
can be defined as a general set of relationships between
IoT objects in SIoT such as friendship, colleagues, parental,
social or co-ownership [57], [58]. Social relationships be-
tween owners of the IoT objects can influence the social
relationships between IoT devices in the sense that two IoT
devices from different users develop a social relationship
if devices communicate with others. However, malicious
attacks against the IoT ecosystem can have a considerable
impact on the trustworthiness in both scenarios of SIoT:
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human and objects-wise. Here our objective is to evaluate
the trustworthiness in two aspects: trustworthiness of IoT
device and trustworthiness of the owner. The former would
provide a clear picture about the behavior of a specific IoT
device which also characterizes the behavior of the owner
for the particular service, i.e., a personalized trust of the
owner, and the latter presents how the owner behaves as
an aggregate for his provided services using all owned
devices. In our trust model, we assume that at the end of the
transaction, the user assigns a trustworthiness score to the
IoT device which is then combined in a decentralized way
for computing the trustworthiness in an aggregate manner.
3.2 Secure Multiparty Computation
Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) enables parties to
securely compute mathematical functions without inferring
the values of the input data points provided by the par-
ticipating parties. SMC methods have been used in several
domains: for example, online e-voting [59], [60], privacy-
preserving statistical analysis and data aggregation [18],
[61], [61], [62], and privacy-preserving aggregation of user
feedback [63] in online social networks. In SMC settings, the
system has several collaborating parties, say p1, p2, . . . , pn,
each with a private input x1, x2, . . . , xn. The involved par-
ties perform mathematical operations (e.g., addition, mean,
median, etc.) on the encrypted data points provided by
the participating parties say f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) without be-
ing to infer the values of other individuals’ inputs. To
ensure privacy, SMC techniques operate over the encrypted
data points and the result of the computation is the same
as the operations performed over the corresponding non-
encrypted values, i.e., Encryption(a) ∗ Encryption(b) =
Encryption(a⊕ b).
The SMC system consists of the following steps: gener-
ation of public and private keys, encrypting the user’s sub-
mitted values using the generated keys, performing math-
ematical computation over the corresponding encrypted
text or data, and finally revealing the final results. In this
paper, an additive homomorphic cryptosystem is adopted
for accumulating the data provided by users without using
any trusted third party.
3.3 Homomorphic Encryption Method
The Homomorphic cryptographic primitives that are used
in the design of self-enforcing trust management are based
on the homomorphic encryption method proposed for the
self-enforcing verifiable electronic voting [60]. The system
computes the final result without relying on any trusted
tallying authorities. Let U = {1, 2, . . . , N} be the set of
users in the IoT ecosystem having the private trust ratings
(0,1) for their interacted IoT objects and owners of the IoT
devices. We assume a multiplicative cyclic group of Z∗q , e.g.,
the same as used in the Digital Signature Algorithm (we
can also use the additive cyclic group as used in the Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, but the protocol works
basically the same). q is a large prime. Let there be another
large prime p such that p | q − 1. Further, let there be a
subgroup G and g is the generator of G. G is a subgroup
of Z∗q with prime order p. All modular operations in G are
performed with respect to the modulus q. However, we omit
modp for simplicity. In order to participate in the secure
feedback aggregation, the owner or user of the IoT object
first generates a private key, i.e., Ski ∈ Zp for i ∈ N . The
user also generates the corresponding public key Pki and




When all participating users have published their re-
spective Pki at the PBB, the user generates a key used for
encrypting the direct feedback values. The encryption key








The computation of Yi as above ensures that∏
i∈N
Y Skii = 1 (1)
Equation 1 ensures that Y Skii can be used as a random-
izer for computing the secret feedback. Any participant of
the system or anyone having access to PBB can compute the
final score of the IoT device or user using the encrypted val-
ues from the published cryptograms. In our design, we do
not require a trusted third party system for the decryption
of the final results.
3.4 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof
A zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is the system that consists
of two entities, a prover, and a verifier. The verifier can
establish the truthfulness of the information provided by
the prover (participants in our case) without learning any
information other than the truth of the statement. The use of
ZKP ensures that the malicious Prover could not convince
the Verifier of false (out-of-range) feedback values, and a
malicious verifier would not infer anything from the values
other than that correctness that the values fall within the
prescribed range. Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
(NIZK) is the class of ZKPs that do not require the explicit
interaction between the verifier and the prover. In our
trust management system, we adopted proof of knowledge
to establish two statements: firstly, the secret parameters
chosen by participants are truly generated, and secondly, the
encrypted feedbacks are correctly constructed i.e., are within
the prescribed range of value. In this work, Fiat-Shamir
heuristics are used to transform interactive zero-knowledge
proofs as non-interactive proof [64] (also see [65]).
3.5 Public Bulletin Board
The public bullet board (PBB) is a publicly readable append-
only database for publishing crypto parameters for the
participants. It is commonly used in verifiable e-voting sys-
tems [59], [65] to realize a public authenticated channel, so
everyone can freely read the information published by au-
thorized entities and verify it accordingly. Without the PBB,
participants will need to send data directly to each other,
which requires O(n2) channels. With the help of a PBB,
participants only need to interact with a central bulletin
board for publishing and receiving data. The PBB does not
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hold any secret information and does not need to be trusted
since all operations are publicly verifiable. In our proposed
scheme, the PBB holds the following information: the public
keys of users participating in the collaborative process, the
identity of the IoT object (which can be a unique hash or
the IP address), and the encrypted trust feedback scores
submitted by the users about the trustworthiness of others
(IoT objects or users) based on their recent interactions. The
published data also include NIZK proofs provided by the
participants in order to prove that their submitted trust
values are well-formed and are within the prescribed range.
The PBB is available publicly and anyone can read data
from the PBB and can compute the trust score of any object,
however, only the authenticated participants who wish to
participate in the collaborative process are allowed to write
information on the PBB. The authenticity of the data can be
checked through digital signatures. The malicious parties
having access to PBB would not be able to infer the indi-
vidual values of the feedback reported by the participating
users, however, they can compute the trustworthiness of
objects. In our settings, the PBB can be provided by the
entity providing the reputation services. The PBB is not
the central point of failure as it can be implemented in a
distributed way, e.g., as a mirrored website or a blockchain
system [66], [67].
4 PROBLEM DEFINITION
The challenge we are considering is the computation of the
trustworthiness of users and IoT devices in the SIoT. Our
main objective is to carry out trust analysis and computation
in a decentralized privacy-preserving way. The performance
and robustness of any IoT network depend upon their abil-
ity to assess how objects behave in a decentralized manner.
A steadfast method of achieving this is to invite the users
of the system to provide feedback vis-à-vis on a particular
thing, event or object. This feedback is then agglomerated to
compute the aggregate trust-score of an object in question.
However, two important requirements need to be kept in
mind while performing this computation – 1) the feedback
supplied by different users must remain confidential, and 2)
the feedback of different users in the network should have
different weights. These weights should depend upon the
expected accuracy of the feedback measured on the basis
of the performance of the same feedback provider in the
recent past. In other words, the weight associated with a
feedback provider should be continuously updated based
on how accurate she has been in providing ratings in her
last few attempts. This ensures that if a user has provided
accurate feedback in most of her recent attempts, then
higher weights should be assigned to her latest feedback
than others who have a less impeccable track record. When
a user joins a network, her weight should be initialized
to a low value. If the feedback provided by a user in an
iteration is in line with the overall reputation computed in
that iteration, then her weight should be upgraded. On the
other hand, if there is any disparity between the feedback
provided by a user, and the overall reputation computed at
any stage, then the weight of the concerned user should
be downgraded. Such an actualization of the weights of
the user should be done seamlessly. The former goal can
be achieved by employing encryption techniques, whereas
the latter goal can be achieved by making efficient use of
Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) proofs. Here, we
must keep in mind that the weight associated with a user
should be private to the user herself and is not to be made
public. Nonetheless, the NIZK proofs should be crafted in a
way to establish that the update of the weights associated
with a user has been done correctly, and thus the encrypted
feedback provided by the user is within the permissible
limits as specified by her secret weight at that point in time.
Every user should dynamically update her weight after the
end of the evaluation cycle and, when she provides her
next feedback, she should provide NIZK proof of correct
updating of her weight without revealing the weight itself.
In this paper, we provide a scheme that allows the users
of the IoT system to provide feedback corresponding to an
object or event in the IoT network. The feedback represents
the weighted rating provided by a user. The feedback is
encrypted using a public-key encryption scheme in a way
that allows public computation of the aggregated feedback
without reverting to any trusted third party for decryption.
The aggregated feedback or the overall reputation is the
weighted sum of all the ratings given by the users. Thus,
the aggregate feedback represents the weighted average of
all ratings provided by all the users. Each of the participants
also provides NIZK proofs to prove that the feedback rep-
resents the correct encryption of her input with the correct
weight assigned to her. The assigned weight is based on her
previous weight and her accuracy in that iteration. The user
dynamically updates her weights at the end of each iteration
depending upon how accurate she has been in her opinion
about the object/event in question. Once all the trust scores
are published, anyone can compute the overall trust score of
any IoT object in the system. The NIZK proofs also enable
public verification of the correctness of the protocol.
5 PROPOSED SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we discuss the mechanism for trust aggre-
gation. Before we get into the steps used in computing the
aggregated trust, we will first discuss the system architec-
ture, the assumptions used in this paper and provide the
threat model.
5.1 System Components
The system setup of the proposed trust management sys-
tem is presented in Figure 2. The system consists of three
functional entities: users, IoT objects and a public bulletin
board. The users receive information from the IoT objects and
provide a rating based on the positive or negative response
from the IoT objects. The IoT objects provide service to the
users, for example, providing road conditions, etc. Users
rate IoT objects at the scores of 0 to 1. The bulletin board
holds the information reported by the users and is publicly
readable. The PBB is responsible for two types of operations:
1) providing the facility to allow authenticated users to post
the crypto parameters, the encrypted feedback, and NIZK
proof of feedback scores 2) making data publicly available to
everyone for computing aggregated trustworthiness of the
objects. The functionality of PBB can be either distributed or
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Fig. 2: The System Architecture of the Proposed System
centralized and is managed by any entity in the social IoT
ecosystem.
5.2 Adversarial Model
The objective of a crowdsourced trust management sys-
tem is to compute the trustworthiness of IoT objects from
the data or feedback trust values provided by the partici-
pants. Another major goal of such a system is to carry out
trust computation with the inherent property of privacy-
preservation. The computation system broadly has two
types of participants: an honest participant who always
correctly follows the protocol specification, and a malicious
participant who has motives of disrupting the functionality
of the system. The honest and malicious participants also
have a common motive: i.e., inferring the trust values of
participants and their communication behavior.
In our privacy-preserving trust system, we consider the
following adversarial models to ensure the correctness of
computation and privacy-preservation. The first is a semi-
honest model also known as an honest-but-curious ad-
versarial model. In this model, the participants adhere to
the protocol specification; however, they also attempt to
interpret the meaning of information contributed by other
participants and try to infer their communication network.
The second model is a malicious model. Participants in this
model not only try to interpret the contributed information
but also try to disrupt the functionality of the protocol by
not following the protocol specification. In our settings, the
malicious participants may try to submit feedback values
that are not within the prescribed range in order to artifi-
cially increase the trust of some specified users.
5.3 Assumptions of the Protocol
The participants of the system have to agree on the cyclic
group G with p elements, p being a prime number. The
cyclic group G is publicly known to everyone. We assume
that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is com-
putationally hard in the group G. Let g be a generator of G
which is known publicly. All modular operations in G are
performed with reference to a prime modulus q. We have
omitted “ mod q” throughout the paper for simplicity. For
the information holding and processing, we assume that
there exists a public bulletin board which is readable to all,
but writable only to authenticated participants. The authen-
ticity of the data sent by the participants can be checked by
using digital signatures. We assume an ‘append-only’ PBB:
i.e., participants are not allowed to overwrite their already
submitted data. In the setup phase of the trust management
system, the public keys of authorized users are published
on the PBB. Any subsequent posting by the same users
can be ensured by verifying the digital signature against
the initially committed public keys. The same append-only
bulletin board is commonly used in e-voting, e.g., see [60],
[65], [68]. A blockchain is essentially a public bulletin board
with distributed data storage and computing power, and
hence can be used in our system to realize the PBB. An





p order of G
∗ Group operation in G
g Random generator of G
n no. of users
Ui i’th user
W weight vector
sij secret rating of Ui in iteration j
wij weight of Ui in iteration j
τj weighted sum of all ratings in iteration j
Tj Overall reputation computed in iteration j
xij Secret key of Ui in iteration j
Xij Public key of Ui in iteration j
Yij Restructured key of Ui in iteration j
TABLE 1: Table of Notations
Initialization. We consider a network of n IoT users
where the value of n is a variable. The value of n changes
as new devices join or leave the network. There is a weight
vector W = (w1, w2, . . . , wn) associated with the network,
where wi ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. When a user (device) Ui is added
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to the IoT network, her weight wi is initialized to a low
value such as 1, and the value of n is incremented by one.
The Goal. The network continuously computes the
reputation of events or objects concerning the functioning
of the IoT devices. In iteration j, the network computes the
reputation of an object and depending upon the decision
updates the weights of all the IoT devices participating in
the process. In each iteration j the network computes the
weighted sum of all ratings provided by the n devices as
follows: τj =
∑n
i=1 wijsij , where sij ∈ {−1, 1} is the secret
rating of Ui in iteration j and wij ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is the
weight of Ui in iteration j. Then everyone computes:
Tj =
{
+1 : if τj > 0
−1 : otherwise
(2)
Hence the overall reputation of the subject is +1 if the
weighted sum of the reputation scores of all participating
users is positive, and is −1 otherwise. Note, that the value
of τj is between −θ and +θ, where θ is the sum of weights
associated with the users, that is, θ =
∑n
i=1 wij . Hence, we
assign +1 value to the reputation of the subject if the value
of τj falls on the higher side of its range.
Once Tj is computed, each Ui updates its weight accord-
ing to the following rule:
wi(j+1) =

wij : if (wij = 1 ∧ Tj = −sij)∨
(wij = 5 ∧ Tj = sij)
wij + 1 : if wij < 5 ∧ Tj = sij
wij − 1 : if wij > 1 ∧ Tj = −sij
(3)
In the above equation, the weight associated with a user
is incremented by 1 if she had given a correct rating in
the previous iteration inconsistent with the aggregate result.
That is, the weight of a user is upgraded if her rating in
the previous iteration was the same as the overall rating
computed in that iteration. For example, if a user gives +1
rating to a subject in an iteration i, and the overall rating
of that subject computed in iteration i is also +1, then the
weight associated with the user will be upgraded by 1.
Similarly, the weight associated with a user is decreased by
1 if the rating provided by her in an iteration is contrary
to the overall rating computed in that iteration. We also
emphasize that the weight associated with a user is between
1 and 5. That is the weight of a user cannot go below 1 or
higher than 5. If the weight of a user is 5 in an iteration, and
she does give the correct rating in that iteration, her weight
will remain so in the next iteration. Here, 1 and 5 are just
examples for the lower and higher bounds, but they can be
other values as well.
The Protocol
In each iteration j, each user Ui : i ∈ [1, n] needs to execute
two rounds. These are explained below.
Round I (Key Generation). In this round each device
Ui : i ∈ [1, n] selects a random xij ∈ Zp and posts on the
bulletin board a public key Xij = gxij . Ui also posts a NIZK
proof π1 on the bulletin board. This NIZK proof proves that
given Xij , the user Ui has knowledge of xij = loggXij . In
this paper, we use Schnorr signature protocol to form the
NIZK [69].
Round II (Feedback Generation). In this round, every
user Ui : i ∈ [1, n] downloads all public keys Xij up-
loaded by every user Uk : k ∈ [1, n] \ {k}, in the first







k=i+1 xkj . Thereafter,
Ui computes a ballot Bij = Y
xij
ij g
sijwij . Ui posts Bij on
the bulletin board. Bi also posts a NIZK proof Πi on the
bulletin board. Bij proves the well-formedness of Bij given
Xij , Bij and the fact that sij ∈ {−1, 1} and wij is computed
from wi(j−1) in accordance with equation 3.
Computation of Reputation. Once every user has posted




















Hence, Dij = g
∑n
i=1 sijwij = gτj . A brute force search on
Dij will yield the value of τj =
∑n
i=1 sijwij . Brute force
search will be feasible since the value τj is a small number
within the range [−n, n]. Once τj is computed, Tj can be
found using Equation 2. Similarly, the weight wis can be
updated using Equation 3.
7 SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section, we address how the proposed mechanism
ensures privacy, confidentiality, integrity, and correctness of
computation.
7.1 Defence against malicious adversary
The intention of a polynomial-time adversary is to disrupt
the functioning of the trust management system by pro-
viding out-of-range inputs. Our trust management system
makes use of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, so the
malicious adversary will not be able to churn out feedback
corresponding to out-of-range inputs unless she can break
the security of the NIZK proof system which only occurs
with a negligible probability.
7.2 Defence against honest-but-curious adversary
Now, we consider an honest-but-curious adversary who
follows the protocol correctly but tries to gain information
about the rating of one or more specific users’ inputs. We
recognize that all cryptograms generated by the users are
well-formed, as ensured by the NIZK proofs. The adversary
colludes with some users to find information about the
secret ratings provided by non-colluding users. Our main
result is Theorem 1. In order to prove Theorem 1, we need
the help of Assumption 2. In order to prove Assumption
2, we need the Assumption 1. We show that the proposed
approach only allows the adversary to infer the final trust-
worthiness of users and devices (
∑
i wij · sij) which is the
public information. The transcript of the protocol does not
allow the adversary to deduce any valuable information
that cannot be inferred from the final trustworthiness scores.
Note that, if the adversary colludes with some of the users,
IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL. 9
she will know their input ratings and the associated weights.
So, the adversary can subtract the weighted ratings of the
colluding users from the overall weighted sum. In this
case, the attacker can find out the value of the partial
weighted sum of the ratings contributed by honest users.
The proposed protocol under this setup would not allow
the adversary to infer any private information other than
the publicly available tallying information, and the inputs of
the colluding compromised users. Hence, our scheme offers
the best possible security protection even in the presence of
colluding users.
Assumption 1. Given g, ga, gb and a challenge Ω ∈ {gab, R},
it is difficult to compute whether value of Ω equals gab
or R.
Assumption 2. Let us assume, x =
(ga1 , ga2 , . . . , gak−1), y = (gb1 , gb2 , . . . , gbk−1)
and, X = (ga1b1 , ga2b2 , . . . , gak−1bk−1). Also
let us assume, X = X1 ∗ X2 ∗ . . . ∗ Xk and
Y = Y1 ∗ Y2 ∗ . . . ∗ Yk. If X
c≈ Y , then









Lemma 1. Assumption 1 implies assumption 2.
Proof 1. Let Ai = gaibi for i ∈ [1, k − 1]. (A1 ∗
X1, A2 ∗ X2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Xk−1, Xk∏k−1
i=1 Ai
) = (A1 ∗ X1, A2 ∗
X2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Xk−1, X∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Xi
). Since, according to
assumption 1; Ai = gaibi
c≈ R,∀i ∈ [1, k − 1], Ai ∗ Xi
c≈




c≈ (A1 ∗ Y1, A2 ∗ Y2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗
Yk−1, X∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Yi
). Now, we claim that:




Y1, A2∗Y2, . . . , Ak−1∗Yk−1, Y∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Yi
), otherwise any-
one can distinguish between X and Y by choosing
random Ais and random Xi’s and thus computing a
challenge (A1∗Y1, A2∗Y2, . . . , Ak−1∗Yk−1, Q∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Yi
),
where Q ∈ {X ,Y}. If the challenge (A1 ∗ Y1, A2 ∗
Y2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗ Yk−1, Q∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Yi
) is correctly identified




c≈ (A1 ∗ Y1, A2 ∗ Y2, . . . , Ak−1 ∗
Yk−1, Y∏k−1
i=1 Ai∗Yi
). Thus, the lemma holds.
Theorem 1. Let A be an adversary that has corrupted up to
c users Ui with indices i ∈ C . As such, in an iteration j,
A will learn nothing other than
∑
i∈[n]\C sijwij .
Proof 2. We show that the adversary A will not be able
to distinguish between two bulletin boards B and B′ in
which the honest users have different inputs as well as
different weights if the weighted sums of inputs are the
same in both the bulletin boards. Let us assume D =
[n]\C andD = {h1, h2, . . . , ht}. Let shkj and s′hkj be the
secret inputs of each honest user Uhk corresponding to
bulletin board B and B′ respectively. Similarly, let whkj
and w′hkj be the secret inputs of each honest user Uhk








w′hkj . Let, the
public keys of Uhi be given by Xhi = g
xhi for i ∈ [t]. Let
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn−t}. The public key of Uci is given by
Xci = g
xci for i ∈ [n−t]. The secret input and the weight
of each Uci is scij and wcij respectively for both the




gscijwcij = gxcijycijgscijwcij : i ∈ [1, n− t].
The ballot submitted by each honest user Uhi to bul-




gxhijgshijwhij : i ∈ [1, t]. Similarly, the ballot submit-
ted by each honest user Uhi to bulletin board B′ is
























since the users in C are compromised, A can find∏t
i=1 g

































w′hkj . According to
assumption 2,
(Bh1j , Bh2j , . . . , B̃htj)
c≈ (B′h1j , B
′
h2j , . . . , B̃
′
htj)
Hence, the lemma holds.
7.3 Unlinkability
In the above section, we have shown that no polynomial-
time adversary can find any information about the secret
input and weight of an honest user, other than what she can
learn from the publicly known output of the protocol. If she
colludes with some of the participants, she will get to learn
their inputs and weights associated with them. Then she
can eliminate the colluding users’ inputs from the overall
weighted sum. As such, she will be left with the partial
weighted sum of the ratings of honest users. This is what
she can learn in the worst case. Given this partial sum,
there could be many possible inputs and associated weights
that would lead to the same partial sum. The adversary has
no way to distinguish between all these possibilities. In a
way, this would cripple the ability of the adversary to link
a particular input or weight to a particular user. However,
if the adversary corrupts a sufficient number of users she
can reduce the number of possibilities. For example, if the
adversary corrupts n − 1 users, then she can compute the
weighted value of the sole honest user by subtracting the
weighted sum of the corrupt users’ inputs from the output
of the protocol τj . This is unavoidable as the goal of this
protocol is to compute τj . So, our protocol ensures the
unlinkability of inputs to the users as long as the output
of the protocol does not negate it.
8 EFFICIENCY
This section evaluates the performance of our proposed
system for performance metrics, i.e, computation and band-
width overheads incurred by the protocol operations. We
evaluate the computation and communication overheads
required for generating the cryptograms of the trust scores
and NIZK proofs. Our protocol consists of performing two
rounds in every iteration. In the first round, each of the users
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chooses a secret key and publishes the corresponding public
key. The computation of the public key from the secret key
requires exactly one exponentiation. Further, the user needs
to submit encrypted feedback in the second round, which re-
quires one exponentiation per user. Thus, for generating the
feedback, each user needs to do 2 exponentiations. However,
the most expensive operation in our scheme is the genera-
tion of the NIZK proofs. The NIZK proof πi proves that each
user knows the secret key corresponding to her public key.
This NIZK proof is constructed using the Schnorr protocol
[70], which requires one exponentiation for the generation
of the arguments and two exponentiations for verification of
the arguments. The other NIZK proof is Πi which proves the
well-formedness of the encrypted feedback Bij in iteration
j. As shown in the Appendix, the construction of each of
these NIZK proofs needs 156 exponentiations per user and
verification of the same requires 160 exponentiations for
one NIZK proof. Table 2 shows a computation overhead
observed while generating the feedback scores at the user
side and then verifying it during the verification process.
Now, we discuss the bandwidth cost of our scheme. Each
of the public keys and the feedbacks is represented by one
element of G. The NIZK proof πi comprises one commit-
ment, one challenge and a single response, hence, the total
size of the proof is 3. Note that the commitment is a group
element whereas the challenge and the response belong to
Zp. Also, as discussed in the Appendix, the NIZK proof Πi
comprises 140 elements. Thus the bandwidth overhead on
one user is equal to 145. Table 3 shows the communication
bandwidth required for submitting cryptograms to the bul-
letin board.
Round I Round II
Entity Public Key NIZKP Feedback NIZKP Total
User 1 1 1 156 159
Verifier - 2n - 160n 162n
TABLE 2: The exponentiations required in Feedback and
Verification Process. Here, n is the total number of users.
Round I Round II
Entity Public Key NIZKP Feedback NIZKP Total
User 1 3 1 140 145
Verifier n 3n n 140n 145n
TABLE 3: The Communication Bandwidth required for com-
mitting feedback. Here, n is the total number of users.
9 EVALUATION AND BENCHMARKS
In this section, we present the prototype implementation
of the proposed self-enforcing trust management system
and analyze its computational and bandwidth overheads.
Finally, we discuss how the system can be deployed in a
real-world scenario.
9.1 Prototype Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of the proposed trust
management system which consists of two major compo-
nents: a user module, and the trust aggregation module. For
the bulletin board, we used a simple database to hold the
user-submitted data. We coded the functionality of the user
module and aggregation module in Java using the crypto-
graphic library, i.e. BouncyCastle 2. The prototype supports
all major functions supported by the proposed systems
including the construction of NIZK proofs, generation of
crypto parameters and checks of the NIZK proof to ensure
the well-formedness. For the crypto parameters, we used
standard NIST Curve P-256 [71] for 128-bit security. We have
performed an evaluation using a system with CPU Intel
i-7 and 8GB RAM. For the NIZK proof, we used hashing
commitment method as it incurs a small computation and
communication overhead.
9.2 Benchmarks
We present experimental results for the following three
phases: 1) generating the public, private and encryption
keys, 2) generating the encrypted responses for the user
trust scores, and 3) performing the aggregation to compute
aggregated trustworthiness of users and objects. The time
taken to generate the public, private and encryption keys
is not high. The generation of a pair of public and private
keys would only take around 2 milliseconds, whereas the
restructured key from the posted public keys would be
computed in less than 10 milliseconds for around 100 users.
However, this time increases linearly with the number of
users who agree to provide the responses. The computation-
ally most expensive step in our scheme is the calculation
of the ciphertexts about the user’s trust scores because of
the inclusion of NIZK-proof. Table 4 shows the CPU time
required for calculating the ciphertexts of responses (trust
scores) when the number of responses varies from 1 to 100.
The table shows the running time for each protocol step as
well as the whole running time. The results show that the
computation time is not very large even for a high number
of responses: i.e., the user is able to encrypt responses for 6
devices in less than a second. However, with the parallel
optimization, this time would further increase to a few
milliseconds. Similarly, communication overheads are not
very large. A single encrypted response including the NIZK
proof would only require 140 bytes which increase linearly
with the number of responses.
The results presented in Table 4 achieve comparable
performance as compared to [17], however, the schemes pro-
posed in [17] utilize additional trusted centralized servers
(two) for the privacy-preservation, trust evaluation and
dissemination of final trust score among the collaborating
devices. However, in this paper, we consider the scenario
of trust aggregation without any trusted party in a decen-
tralized setup, thus the system does not require any trusted
system for score dissemination and management.
10 CONCLUSION
A Social Internet of Things (SIoT) is the network paradigm
where the IoT devices interact with each other and develop
the social network among the devices and their users.
The strength of social relationships among users depends
2. https://www.bouncycastle.org/java.html
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Round I Round II
Entity Public Key NIZKP Feedback NIZKP Total
User 6msec 6msec 6msec 936msec 954msec
Verifier - 1.2sec - 32sec 34sec
TABLE 4: The computational overhead for 100 users, each
with 6 IoT devices.
upon the services provided by the users and their IoT
devices. Within this structure, it is important to evaluate
the trustworthiness of IoT devices as well as the users so as
to prevent malicious entities from disseminating malicious
content or causing network disruption. One way to assess
the trustworthiness of entities (users and IoT devices) is
to crowdsource entities to provide feedback about their
interaction with certain IoT devices and users. However,
crowdsourcing has the challenge of privacy-preservation as
the contributed responses could disclose the communication
behavior of devices and users. To address this challenge,
this paper presents a new privacy-preserving system for
assessing the trustworthiness of the IoT devices and users
simultaneously within the SIoT ecosystem. The proposed
system adopts a homomorphic encryption system with
the properties of decentralization, self-enforcement, and
privacy-preservation. The proposed system assures correct
computation, privacy and security of users even in the
presence of malicious parties and colluding users. The self-
enforcing computation is a unique feature of our system,
as the whole computation process does not involve any
trusted third party and it allows publication verification
on the integrity of the scores in an autonomous way. The
privacy and security analysis shows that the contributions
of participants would not allow other users, colluders or
malicious parties to learn the private information during
and after the protocol operations. Through extensive ex-
periments on the prototype implementation, we show that
the proposed system has introduced a small communication
and computation overhead and has the potential to be used
in real-world IoT devices and smartphones.
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APPENDIX
Here we show how each user Ui can construct a NIZK proof
of well-formedness of Bij . This NIZK proof Πi proves the
following statement

(wij = wi(j−1)) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 1) ∧ (Tj = −sij)∨
(wij = wi(j−1)) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 5) ∧ (Tj = sij)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) + 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 4) ∧ (Tj = sij)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) + 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 3) ∧ (Tj = sij)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) + 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 2) ∧ (Tj = sij)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) + 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 1) ∧ (Tj = sij)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) − 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 2) ∧ (Tj = −sij)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) − 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 3) ∧ (Tj = −sij)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) − 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 4) ∧ (Tj = −sij)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) − 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 5) ∧ (Tj = −sij)
Let Tj = 1. As such Πi can be written as

(wij = wi(j−1)) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 1) ∧ (sij = −1)∨
(wij = wi(j−1)) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 5) ∧ (sij = 1)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) + 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 4) ∧ (sij = 1)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) + 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 3) ∧ (sij = 1)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) + 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 2) ∧ (sij = 1)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) + 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 1) ∧ (sij = 1)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) − 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 2) ∧ (sij = −1)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) − 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 3) ∧ (sij = −1)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) − 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 4) ∧ (sij = −1)∨
(wij = wi(j−1) − 1) ∧ (wi(j−1) = 5) ∧ (sij = −1)
This statement is logically equivalent to the below state-
ment.
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
((Bij = g
xijyijg) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)/g))∨
((Bij = g
xijyij/g) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)/g))∨
((Bij = g
xijyijg5) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)g5))∨
((Bij = g
xijyij/g5) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)g5))∨
((Bij = g
xijyijg5) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)g4))∨
((Bij = g
xijyij/g5) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)g4))∨
((Bij = g
xijyijg4) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)g3))∨
((Bij = g
xijyij/g4) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)g3))∨
((Bij = g
xijyijg3) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)g2))∨
((Bij = g
xijyij/g3) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)g2))∨
((Bij = g
xijyijg2) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)g))∨
((Bij = g
xijyij/g2) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)g))∨
((Bij = g
xijyijg4) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)/g5))∨
((Bij = g
xijyij/g4) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)/g5))∨
((Bij = g
xijyijg3) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)/g4))∨
((Bij = g
xijyij/g3) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)/g4))∨
((Bij = g
xijyijg2) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)/g3))∨
((Bij = g
xijyij/g2) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)/g3))∨
((Bij = g
xijyijg) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)/g2))∨
((Bij = g
xijyij/g) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)/g2))
We show how the user Ui can construct a set of NIZK
arguments for the above statement that is when Tj = 1.
The prover can generate NIZK arguments similarly when
Tj = −1. Now, since, the above statement is an OR
statement; exactly one of the sub-statements is correct. We
assume the first sub-statement is correct, that is :
((Bij = g
xijyijg) ∧ (Bi(j−1) = gxi(j−1)yi(j−1)/g)). The
prover generates a real proof for this statement and 19
simulated proofs for the other 19 statements. The prover
chooses random r11, r12 ∈R Zp and computes commitments
ε11 = g
r11 , ε12 = (g
xij )r11 , ε13 = g
r12 , ε14 = (g
xi(j−1))r12 .
The prover also chooses random resh,k, chh, h ∈ [2, 20], k ∈
[1, 2] and computes:
εh,1 = g
resh,1(gxij )chh , εh,2 = (g
xij )resh,1(Bhij)
chh , εh,3 =
gresh,2(gxij )chh , εh,4 = (g
xij )resh,2(Bhi(j−1))
chh for
h ∈ [2, 20]. Here, B2ij = Bij ∗ g,B3ij = Bij/g5, B4ij =
Bij ∗ g5, B5ij = Bij/g5, B6ij = Bij ∗ g5, B7ij = Bij/g4, B8ij =
Bij ∗g4, B9ij = Bij/g3, B10ij = Bij ∗g3, B11ij = Bij/g2, B12ij =
Bij∗g2, B13ij = Bij/g4, B14ij = Bij∗g4, B15ij = Bij/g3, B16ij =
Bij ∗ g3, B17ij = Bij/g2, B18ij = Bij ∗ g2, B19ij = Bij/g,B20ij =
Bij ∗ g. Similarly, B2i(j−1) = Bi(j−1) ∗ g,B3i(j−1) =
Bi(j−1)/g
5, B4i(j−1) = Bi(j−1)/g
5, B5i(j−1) =
Bi(j−1)/g
4, B6i(j−1) = Bi(j−1)/g
4, B7i(j−1) =
Bi(j−1)/g
3, B8i(j−1) = Bi(j−1)/g
3, B9i(j−1) =
Bi(j−1)/g






i(j−1) = Bi(j−1) ∗
g5, B14i(j−1) = Bi(j−1) ∗ g5, B15i(j−1) = Bi(j−1) ∗ g4, B16i(j−1) =
Bi(j−1) ∗ g4, B17i(j−1) = Bi(j−1) ∗ g3, B18i(j−1) =
Bi(j−1) ∗ g3, B19i(j−1) = Bi(j−1) ∗ g2, B20i(j−1) = Bi(j−1) ∗ g2.
Let the random challenge of the NIZK proof be ch.The
prover computes ch1 = ch−
∑20
h=2 ch. The prover computes
responses res11 = r11 − ch1 ∗ xij and res12 = r12 − ch1 ∗
xi(j−1).
The verification equations are as follows
1) gresh,1 ?= εh,1
(gxij )chh
,∀h ∈ [1, 20]
2) gresh,2 ?= εh,3
(gxij )chh
,∀h ∈ [1, 20]
3) (gyij )res1,1 ?= ε1,2
(Bij/g)ch1
4) (gyi(j−1))res1,2 ?= ε1,4
(Bi(j−1)∗g)ch1
5) (gyij )res2,1 ?= ε2,2
(Bij∗g)ch2
6) (gyi(j−1))res2,2 ?= ε2,4
(Bi(j−1)∗g)ch2
7) (gyij )res3,1 ?= ε3,2
(Bij/g5)ch3
8) (gyi(j−1))res3,2 ?= ε3,4
(Bi(j−1)/g5)
ch3
9) (gyij )res4,1 ?= ε4,2
(Bij∗g5)ch4
10) (gyi(j−1))res4,2 ?= ε4,4
(Bi(j−1)/g5)
ch4
11) (gyij )res5,1 ?= ε5,2
(Bij/g5)ch5
12) (gyi(j−1))res5,2 ?= ε5,4
(Bi(j−1)/g4)
ch5
13) (gyij )res6,1 ?= ε6,2
(Bij∗g5)ch6
14) (gyi(j−1))res6,2 ?= ε6,4
(Bi(j−1)/g4)
ch6
15) (gyij )res7,1 ?= ε7,2
(Bij/g4)ch7
16) (gyi(j−1))res7,2 ?= ε7,4
(Bi(j−1)/g3)
ch7
17) (gyij )res8,1 ?= ε8,2
(Bij∗g4)ch8
18) (gyi(j−1))res8,2 ?= ε8,4
(Bi(j−1)/g3)
ch8
19) (gyij )res9,1 ?= ε9,2
(Bij/g3)ch9
20) (gyi(j−1))res9,2 ?= ε9,4
(Bi(j−1)/g2)
ch9
21) (gyij )res10,1 ?= ε10,2
(Bij∗g3)ch10
22) (gyi(j−1))res10,2 ?= ε10,4
(Bi(j−1)/g2)
ch10
23) (gyij )res11,1 ?= ε11,2
(Bij/g2)ch11
24) (gyi(j−1))res11,2 ?= ε11,4
(Bi(j−1)/g)
ch11
25) (gyij )res12,1 ?= ε12,2
(Bij∗g2)ch12
26) (gyi(j−1))res12,2 ?= ε12,4
(Bi(j−1)/g)
ch12
27) (gyij )res13,1 ?= ε13,2
(Bij/g4)ch13
28) (gyi(j−1))res13,2 ?= ε13,4
(Bi(j−1)∗g5)ch13
29) (gyij )res14,1 ?= ε14,2
(Bij∗g4)ch14
30) (gyi(j−1))res14,2 ?= ε14,4
(Bi(j−1)∗g5)ch14
31) (gyij )res15,1 ?= ε15,2
(Bij/g3)ch15
32) (gyi(j−1))res15,2 ?= ε15,4
(Bi(j−1)∗g4)ch15
33) (gyij )res16,1 ?= ε16,2
(Bij∗g3)ch16
34) (gyi(j−1))res16,2 ?= ε16,4
(Bi(j−1)∗g4)ch16
35) (gyij )res17,1 ?= ε17,2
(Bij/g2)ch17
36) (gyi(j−1))res17,2 ?= ε17,4
(Bi(j−1)∗g3)ch17
37) (gyij )res18,1 ?= ε18,2
(Bij∗g2)ch17
38) (gyi(j−1))res18,2 ?= ε18,4
(Bi(j−1)∗g3)ch17
39) (gyij )res19,1 ?= ε19,2
(Bij/g)ch19
40) (gyi(j−1))res19,2 ?= ε19,4
(Bi(j−1)∗g2)ch19
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41) (gyij )res20,1 ?= ε20,2
(Bij∗g)ch20
42) (gyi(j−1))res20,2 ?= ε20,4
(Bi(j−1)∗g2)ch20
If the above 80 equations are satisfied, the NIZK proof
is correct. The prover needs to perform 156 exponentiations
for generating all the NIZK arguments. On the other hand,
the verifier needs to do 160 exponentiations for verifying all
of them. The NIZK proof consists of 80 commitments, 20
challenges and 40 responses, hence, the communication cost
of the NIZK proof is 140. In a similar way, the prover can
compute NIZK proofs when the other statements are true.
